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Abstract
Modern blockchain systems are a fresh look at the paradigm of distributed computing, applied
under new assumptions of large-scale open public networks. They can be used to store and share
information without a trusted central party. There has been much theoretical and practical effort
to develop blockchain systems for a myriad of uses, ranging from cryptocurrencies to identity
control, supply chain management, clearing and settlement, and more. However, none of this
work has directly studied the many fundamental database-related issues that arise when using
blockchains as the underlying infrastructure to store and manage data.
The key difference between using blockchains to store data and centrally controlled databases
(of any type) is that transactions are accepted to a blockchain via a consensus mechanism, and
not by the controlling central party. Hence, once a user has issued a transaction, she cannot be
certain if it will be accepted. Moreover, a yet unaccepted transaction cannot be retracted by the
user, and may be appended to the blockchain at any point in the future. This causes difficulties
as the user may wish to reissue a transaction, if it was not accepted. Yet this data may then
become appended twice to the blockchain.
In this paper, we present a database perspective on blockchains by introducing formal theor-
etical foundations for blockchains as a data storage layer that underlies a database. The main
issue that we tackle is the uncertainty in transaction appending that is a direct result of the
consensus mechanism. We study two flavors of the transaction appending problem. First, we
consider the complexity of determining whether it is possible for a denial constraint to be contra-
dicted, given the current state of the blockchain, pending transactions, and integrity constraints
on blockchain data. Second, we determine the complexity of generating transactions that are
(or are not) mutually consistent with given subsets of pending transactions. The ability to solve
these problems is critical in ensuring that users can issue transactions that are consistent with
their intentions. Finally, we chart directions for future work by discussing some of the new and
important research challenges that arise when data are stored using blockchains.
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1 Introduction
Blockchains are becoming increasingly popular as a foundation for systems that share
information in a trustworthy way, but without a trusted central party. Among other uses,
they form the basis for permissionless open systems in which participation is unregulated.
Bitcoin,1 created by Satoshi Nakamoto [29], is perhaps the prominent example of a
permissionless blockchain system. It allows anyone to hold and transfer funds. To do
1 We use the standard uppercase Bitcoin when referring to the system, and the lowercase bitcoin when
referring to units of the currency.
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XX:2 Database Perspectives on Blockchains
so, rather than having a central server on which balances are kept, it decentralizes the
management of funds between the many nodes in the Bitcoin network. Each node holds a
copy of all transactions made within the blockchain. Bitcoin’s appearance inspired the use
of similar techniques to synchronize other forms of information in other systems, including
many similar cryptocurrencies, but also brought a resurgence of interest in decentralizing
existing systems, in the enterprise setting.
In this paper we aim to explore some of the foundations of blockchains as a storage level in
a manner that generalizes across different protocols and consensus mechanisms. Conceptually,
blockchain systems consist of a consensus layer that coordinates data synchronization between
nodes (often in adversarial settings like Byzantine Fault Tolerance), and the data consistency
layer that determines what are the legal states of the data and how it may evolve. In this
paper we focus on the data consistency layer, and on the ramifications of the consensus layer
on the possible states of the data.
Differences from classical database systems. A Blockchain is typically an append-only
data structure, which is essentially a serialized record of accepted entries. Each individual
block is an ordered batch of such updates that were committed together. Updates are added
through a consensus mechanism in which all participants continually construct new blocks
and accept them into the chain.
This interaction is quite different from traditional database systems. While traditional
systems may employ sharding or distribute the load of processing the data, they are still
essentially keeping information under the control of a single, possibly distributed, software
system, which can be considered to be a centralized entity. In blockchains, the main
assumption is that participants are separate entities that are not controlled by the same
administrator, and that records are accepted by consensus mechanisms.
Centralized entities are more efficient than blockchain systems, but in exchange are
highly susceptible to the failure or corruption of that entity. When only a single entity is
in charge of record keeping, users may have their records erased, or altered without their
permission. In currency systems, such interventions amount to freezing assets, or the seizure
of funds without permission from their owner. Mainly for this reason, cryptocurrencies are
implemented in a decentralized manner.
While updates to the blockchain become irreversible once committed (at least with very
high probability), there is no guarantee that a certain update will indeed be accepted.2
Rules on the consistency of the database and the validity of transactions, that are applied by
every individual node, effectively govern what enters the blockchain, in addition to external
considerations that may affect nodes (such as fees paid to include certain transactions).
Users that wish to add a record to the blockchain must create (and possibly sign) an
appropriate message. The message is sent to the nodes that participate in the consensus
mechanism for consideration. Thus, even an old record that was created and propagated to
other nodes by its original creator may be suddenly added to the blockchain. Users thus
have a high level of uncertainty regarding transactions that have yet to be accepted.
A motivating example. As a simple motivating example, we will consider a Bitcoin exchange,
that regularly accepts and issues payments in bitcoins in return for dollars or euros. Each
payment that is issued by the exchange requires a miner’s fee that is paid out to the node
2 Some blockchain systems have guaranteed irreversibility, while others, like Bitcoin, do so probabilistically
with probability approaching one as time proceeds.
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that approves the transaction and includes it inside a Bitcoin block. Fees form a part of the
transaction message, and as such must be specified when the transaction is prepared.
Once the exchange broadcasts the transaction to the network, it must hope that it
will be included in the blockchain. Unfortunately, since fees in the network can often
fluctuate (depending on competition for limited space in Bitcoin blocks) it is quite possible
for transactions not to be accepted by the network, or to get delayed for extended periods. In
this case, the exchange would still be interested in issuing the transaction, perhaps with an
increased fee the second time around. Alas, once two transaction messages are broadcast to
the network, it is again quite possible that both the new and the old message will be included
in the blockchain. Once signed, a transaction can be rebroadcast to the network by anyone,
and is in fact often stored by nodes, with the hope of later inclusion in the blockchain. The
unfortunate consequence of two such transactions making it to the blockchain is that the
exchange would then pay its customer twice the amount it had intended.
The design of Bitcoin transactions does include a remedy for this situation: two transac-
tions can be made to conflict in such a way as to rule out their co-existence in the blockchain.
Careful practices by the exchange would require that reissued transactions be set up in
such a manner. In Section 2 we go into more details and explain the structure of Bitcoin
transactions and the validity rules that introduce such relations between them.
It is interesting to note that the problem we describe above is not merely hypothetical, but
was actually used to attack exchanges in the past. Bitcoin transactions used to be somewhat
malleable: one could change the contents of transactions in ways that would preserve their
effects and maintain the validity of all cryptographic signatures. Attackers who withdrew
funds from exchanges then rebroadcasted a changed version of their withdrawal transaction
which was later accepted into the blockchain. Unfortunately, the exchanges did not notice,
and reissued the payments. This resulted in withdrawals being issued more than once [14].
While this example is specific to Bitcoin, it points to a deeper issue that arises when
using a blockchain to store data. Uncertainty as to which transactions will be committed
may lead to different possible worlds. It is critical to be able to ascertain that there are no
possibilities for undesirable outcomes.
Contributions. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
We present the first abstract model of databases using blockchains as a storage layer,
called blockchain databases. Our model captures the main properties of such databases,
while being independent of the specific protocol and implementation of the blockchain.
Since blockchains are already the underlying storage layer for cryptocurrencies, and are
being extensively explored for other data storage scenarios, such a modelling is a first
step towards studying the ramifications of using a blockchain as for storage in a database.
We study the problem of determining whether a blockchain database can reach an
undesirable state and provide complete complexity results. (A formal notion of desirability
of outcomes is part of our model.)
We study a complementary problem of automatically generating transactions for the
database. Here we aim to avoid undesirable situations by creating structures of dependen-
cies and contradictions that will preclude undesirable states. We provide both algorithms
and an undecidability result.
Finally, we chart directions for future work by discussing some of the new and important
research challenges that arise when databases are based on blockchains.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Bitcoin’s blockchain and
structure of transactions, to ground our work in an important real-world implementation.
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Next, in Section 3, we review related work, pertaining to blockchains and to databases. We
present the formal framework in Section 4 and define problems of interest in Section 5. We
study the denial constraint satisfaction problem in Section 6 and the problem of transaction
generation in Section 7. We discuss important future research directions in Section 8 and in
Section 9 we conclude. Due to space limitations, all proofs are deferred to the appendix.
2 Bitcoin’s blockchain and the structure of transactions
While the paper presents results that generalize to any blockchain database, due to its
popularity, we use Bitcoin as our running example throughout the paper. In this section,
we provide a brief overview of the Bitcoin protocol and its specific use of the blockchain.
The reader is referred to other, more-detailed explanations [41] for more information, and
to [1] for a discussion of blockchain consensus protocols from the viewpoint of foundations of
distributed computing. The goal of this overview is to ground the discussion in concrete
terms and relate the results to a real-world system.
The Bitcoin network is comprised of a set of nodes that together form a P2P network.
Nodes in the network authorize Bitcoin transactions and include them in batches called
blocks. Each block is a collection of transactions that transfer the bitcoin currency between
different addresses. Addresses are effectively public keys that are associated with the money
being transfered to denote ownership.
Each block additionally contains a cryptographic hash of a predecessor block. Blocks are
thus arranged in a chain. The first block that was created at the inception of the system is
known as the Genesis Block. The act of creation of blocks requires a difficult computation
(proof-of-work). It rewards the creator of the block with bitcoins collected as fees from each
transaction, as well as bitcoins that are minted at a predetermined rate. The act of block
creation is known as mining, and nodes that choose to invest the computational effort to try
and create blocks are referred to as miners.
As blocks can be created concurrently, slightly different versions of the chain may be held
by different nodes. Miners reach consensus on the blockchain by selecting to adopt the chain
with the most accumulated proof-of-work. They quickly distribute newly found blocks to one
another as well as transaction messages that are meant for inclusion in blocks via a gossip
protocol. Conflicting transactions, or blocks that are off the main chain, are not propagated
and are immediately discarded.
Each transaction in Bitcoin is constructed as a transfer of funds from inputs to outputs
(many-to-many). Outputs are essentially an association between an amount of bitcoins and
a script that specifies how this money is to be claimed. The typical script in Bitcoin requires
that the spender present a valid cryptographic signature in order to spend funds, but other
scripts are also possible, e.g., those requiring a preimage to a cryptographic hash to free funds,
or perhaps several signatures matching different public keys. The inputs of each transaction
essentially point to previously accepted outputs, and provide the necessary response to the
challenge posed by the output scripts that are needed to spend the money. Funds are then
taken from the inputs and redistributed to the output of every transaction.
A Bitcoin transaction is considered to fully spend all inputs that it uses. Two transactions
that share even a single input are thus considered conflicting transactions and cannot be
accepted into the blockchain together. Transactions that spend the outputs of previous ones
are dependent upon these parent transactions and cannot be included without first including
the parent transactions. Figure 1 shows an example of three Bitcoin transactions, along with
their inputs and outputs.
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Figure 1 Structure of some Bitcoin transactions.
3 Related Work
This paper touches on two areas, namely (1) blockchains (and bitcoin, in particular) and (2)
uncertain and inconsistent databases. We discuss related work in each of these areas next.
Blockchains and Bitcoin. There has been significant research on blockchains in general, and
on Bitcoin in particular. For example, recent work has studied susceptibility of Bitcoin to
selfish mining attacks (in which users selectively delay publishing data) [16, 34], protocols to
incentivize data propagation [6], to ensure correct incentives in mining pools [26, 33], and
modifications to the consensus protocol that will enable better scalability [15,19,37,38].
The structure of transactions in Bitcoin allows for de-anonymization and analysis [31,32],
which lead to several works that improved the privacy of cryptocurrencies [13,25,28,35]. The
security of the protocol to double-spending attacks was widely researched [18,22,39]. Other
works have dealt with the susceptibility of Bitcoin to networking attacks [3,21]. However,
no work to date has taken a higher level view of a blockchain as a storage layer, in which
the implementation details of the mechanisms are abstracted away, and the fundamental
querying problems are given full focus.
Uncertain and Inconsistent Databases. Conceptually, a a database using blockchains as a
storage layer, consists of a current state (i.e., a set of relations, stored in the blockchain),
integrity constraints that must hold in every state, and a set of append-only transactions that
have been issued by users, but have not been incorporated (yet) into the blockchain. Thus, a
blockchain database is a succinct representation of a large number of possible worlds. Each
possible world is a consistent set of relations, including the current state, and perhaps the
results of additional transactions from among those issued. Possible worlds are not necessarily
maximal, i.e., they may not contain some of the issued transactions, even though these
transactions can be included while preserving consistency w.r.t. the integrity constraints.
Previous work considered probabilistic databases [9, 12, 36] and inconsistent databases [5,
7, 8, 11, 17, 24, 27, 40], both of which represent many possible worlds in a succinct manner.
Querying is a challenge in both settings, as in the former setting, answers must be returned
with their associated probabilities, and in the latter, only certain answers should be returned.
While a blockchain database is uncertain (as one cannot be sure which transactions will be
accepted), it differs from a probabilistic database. Notably, it is not clear how to realistically
associate probabilities with transactions, as miners can decide which transactions to try to
include in a block, based on many considerations. The results in this paper are somewhat in
the spirit of previous work on inconsistent databases. However, the setting is significantly
different, as are the problems studied, and thus, previous results cannot be used. First and
foremost, a blockchain database is always consistent. Moreover, while repairs (for inconsistent
databases) are typically maximally close to the given data, in some sense, possible worlds
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for blockchains need not be maximal in any sense. Hence, for example, conjunctive query
answering is not a key problem for blockchain databases (see Section 5 for more details).
4 Formal Framework
A relation R(A1, . . . , An) is associated with a set of ground tuples of arity n.3 Given a set
of relations R, an insert transaction (or simply, transaction, for short) for R is a set T of
ground tuples for (some of) the relations in R. Intuitively, T is a set of tuples that we would
like to insert into the relations of R. We consider only insert transactions, as blockchain
databases are append-only databases.
We consider three types of integrity constraints, namely, key constraints, functional
dependencies and inclusion dependencies. Recall that key constraints are a special case of
functional dependencies. For completeness, we define these notions in the appendix. We
define satisfaction of a set of integrity constraints I by a set of relations R in the standard
fashion, and denote this by R |= I.
I Example 4.1. Consider a database containing a simplified version of bitcoin data, with
two relations describing transaction outputs and inputs:
TxOutput(txId, ser, pk, amount) TxInput(prevTxId, prevSer, pk, amount, newTxId, sig).
In TxOutput, attribute txId is a transaction identifier, ser is the serial number of the particular
transaction output (of which there may be several), pk is the public key of the entity receiving
this particular output and amount is the number of bitcoins in the output. In TxInput, the
values prevTxId, prevSer, pk, amount indicate the transaction number, serial number, public
key and amount of the input being consumed. Attribute newTxId is the new transaction
identifier, and sig is a cryptographic signature corresponding to the public key of the entity
whose output is being consumed.
The keys of both relations are underlined. We consider the inclusion dependencies
TxInput[prevTxId, prevSer, pk, amount] ⊆ TxOutput[txId, ser, pk, amount],
TxInput[newTxId] ⊆ TxOutput[txId]
i.e., every input consumed was created as the output of some transaction, and every new
transaction has outputs. J
We now formally define the notion of a blockchain database. A blockchain database D is a
triple (R, I, T ), where
R is a set of relations, called the current state,
I is a set of integrity constraints, such that R |= I,
T = {T1, . . . , Tk} is a finite set of transactions for R, each of which is a set of tuples.
I Example 4.2. Figure 2 contains an extension of the diagram from Figure 1 (depicting
financial transactions) but now also includes transactions that have been issued and not yet
been accepted into the blockchain (blocks with a dotted outline). Figure 2 also contains an
instance of a blockchain database, with the schema from Example 4.1, reflecting the contents
of the diagram. In each table, the first column indicates whether the tuples belong to the
current state R, or to a transaction Ti. J
3 By abuse of notation we use R denote both the schema of a relation, and its contents.
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prevTxId prevSer pk amount newTxId sig
R 1 1 U1Pk 1 3 U1Sig
2 1 U1Pk 1 3 U1Sig
T1 2 2 U2Pk 4 4 U2Sig
T2 4 1 U2Pk 3 5 U2Sig
T3 3 3 U1Pk 0.5 6 U1Sig
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T5 2 2 U2Pk 4 8 U2Sig
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Figure 2 Running example of a simplified Bitcoin blockchain database.
The transactions in T may be appended to the database. However, it is also possible that
they will not be appended, e.g., because they are not mutually consistent with I, because of
network problems, or simply due to lack of financial incentive.4
We define the can-append relationship R →T ,I R′ for D, as follows. We write R →T ,I R′
if R′ = R or there is some T ∈ T such that R′ = R ∪ T and R′ |= I. We denote the
transitive closure of this relationship as R ⇒T ,I R′. Intuitively, this relationship defines
a new instance of relations that can be derived by incrementally adding transactions from
T , while preserving all integrity constraints. We say that R′ is a possible world for D if
R ⇒T ,I R′, and denote the set of all possible worlds of D by Poss(D). Possible worlds can
be efficiently recognized.5
I Proposition 4.3. Let D be a blockchain database and let R′ be a set of relations. It is
possible to determine if R′ ∈ Poss(D) in PTIME.
We note that all tractability results in this paper show polynomiality in the size of the
underlying blockchain and pending transactions. In practice, it is often possible to employ
4 In the real world, transactions are also associated with a fee that is accrued when it is added to the
current state.
5 In some systems it is possible that T is not fully known, as transactions are issued by multiple users
concurrently. However, often transactions that have been issued are propagated among all users.
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indexing in order to iterate only over a small portion of the blockchain. We leave such
practical optimizations for future work.
I Example 4.4. Consider the blockchain database D = (R, I, {T1, T2, T3, T4, T5}) depicted
in Figure 2. Observe that transactions T1 and T5 are not mutually consistent, as including
both would contradict the key constraint on TxInput (intuitively, corresponding to a double-
spending of the same money). It is interesting to note that one of the outputs of T2 is given
to User2, who is the same user creating T2. This accurately reflects the manner in which
transactions are performed in Bitcoin, as users return to their own wallet the remainder of
the input not being sent to another user. Also note that the transaction T4 is dependent on
T2 and T3 (due to the inclusion dependency), and T2, in turn, is dependent on T1.
Thus, Poss(D) contains R, R∪ T1, R∪ T3, R∪ T1 ∪ T3, R∪ T1 ∪ T2, R∪ T1 ∪ T2 ∪ T3,
R∪ T1 ∪ T2 ∪ T3 ∪ T4, and R∪ T5. J
I Remark 1. In our model of a blockchain database we purposely retain only the essentials
that are required to study pivotal database issues. Thus, for example, we ignore the incentives,
consensus mechanisms and confirmation policies used while constructing blockchains. These
are all orthogonal to our study, and also differ between various blockchain systems. We do
not make explicit within R information about how tuples are distributed among the physical
blockchain, as this is not of importance after data is accepted into the chain. (Transaction
ordering is important, due to integrity constraints, while adding transactions, and this is
specified in our model using the can-append relationship.)
We also do not consider forks in the chain, which may create temporary inconsistent
versions of the database, for two main reasons. First, whether or not such forks can exist,
and how they are resolved is system dependent. (For example, Algorand [20], Solida [2] and
ByzCoin [23] do not allow forking.) Second, typically forks are resolved within a few seconds
and, from a theoretical standpoint, such uncertain data is not considered as included in the
database (yet).
5 Problems of Interest
Over time, a blockchain database evolves, by the addition of transactions to the current
state. However, at any given point in time, it is not possible to know for certain which
pending transactions in T will be permanently added to R. One classical question that may
be asked in this setting is as follows: Given a query q and a blockchain database D, what
are all certain answers to q over D? Here certain answers are defined in the natural fashion
(in the spirit of [4]), as tuples that will appear in the result over all possible worlds. In the
setting of blockchain databases, it is not clear that this is of interest, e.g., for conjunctive
queries, the set of certain answers is precisely the result of evaluating q over R.
Looking at this from the opposite perspective, recall that users often issue many transac-
tions, and during this process they do not know for certain which previous transactions will
or will not be appended to the current state. Hence, such a user may wish to ensure that in
all possible worlds, specific undesirable things will not happen, by answering the following
question: Given a Boolean query q, does q evaluate to false over all possible worlds of D?
We call such a Boolean query, which we desire to remain unsatisfied, a denial constraint.
Formally, a denial constraint q is satisfied by a blockchain database D, denoted D |= ¬q, if,
for all R′ ∈ Poss(D), it holds that q(R′) = false.
I Example 5.1. Suppose Alice wishes to pay Bob one bitcoin (e.g., for a service Bob
provided). Alice adds a transaction containing two tuples:
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1. a tuple for TxInput, with information about her bitcoin that will be consumed,6 and
2. a tuple for TxOutput with the public key information of Bob.
After some time passes, Bob complains that he never received payment, i.e., that this
transaction was not added to R. Therefore, Alice sends a new transaction, again containing
two tuples, to transfer money to Bob. Now, Alice may want to be certain that in all possible
worlds, she has sent at most one bitcoin to Bob.
Assuming AlicePK is the public key of Alice, and BobPK is the public key of Bob, she
may use the denial constraint
q1()←TxInput(pt1, ps1, ‘AlicePK’, 1, ntx1, ‘AliceSig’),TxOutput(ntx1, ns1, ‘BobPK’, 1),
TxInput(pt2, ps2, ‘AlicePK’, 1, ntx2, ‘AliceSig’),TxOutput(ntx2, ns2, ‘BobPK’, 1),
ntx1 6= ntx2
specifying that there are two different transactions in which Alice transferred money to Bob.
In practice, Alice may use this denial constraint over the hypothetical situation in which
she has issued the second transaction (i.e., as a dry run, before actually issuing), in order to
determine the safety of performing the second transaction. J
Being able to determine whether a denial constraint is satisfied by a blockchain database
is a fundamental issue, that allows users to interact with the database with some degree of
clarity as to the possible downsides of their transactions. Hence, in this paper we study the
complexity of this problem. Section 6 presents a formal definition of the denial constraint
satisfaction problem and studies the complexity of this problem for different classes of queries,
as well as for different types of integrity constraints.
One way to avoid undesirable possible worlds, is by checking satisfaction of denial
constraints, before issuing a new transaction. Another complementary method is to purposely
generate a new transaction in such a fashion that will not allow it to be included in a possible
world with specific other transactions. Intuitively, the problem of automatically deriving
such new transactions can be described as follows: Given a blockchain database (R, I, T ),
generate a transaction T that is inconsistent with a subset of transactions T1 ⊆ T , but is
consistent with T2 ⊆ T . Note that we say that T is inconsistent with T1 if there is no
possible world containing both T and any T ′ ∈ T1, while T is consistent with T2 if there is a
possible world containing T and all of T2.
I Example 5.2. As in Example 5.1, suppose that Alice wishes to pay Bob one bitcoin. Alices
issues a transaction T1 transferring money as before. Again, time passes, and Bob complains
that he never received payment. Now, Alice would like to generate a new transaction T2 such
that T2 cannot appear together with T1 in any possible world (to avoid double payment). In
addition, Alice may desire that inclusion of T2 in a possible world should not interfere with
some other previous transactions which she issued.
For example, suppose T1 is the set of tuples {TxInput(1037, 2, ‘AlicePK’, 1, 5043, ‘AliceSig’),
TxOutput(5043, 1, ‘BobPK’, 1)}. If all Alice desires is a new transaction inconsistent with T1,
the following transaction T2 could be generated: {TxInput(1037, 2, ‘AlicePK’, 1, 6074, ‘AliceSig’),
TxOutput(6074, 1, ‘BobPK’, 1)}. Observe that T2 and T1 cannot both be in a possible world
together, as this would contradict the key constraint over TxInput. J
The ability to automatically generate a new transaction, given a set of transactions with
which it should be (in)consistent, is very useful when interacting with a blockchain database.
This problem is defined and studied in Section 7, for different classes of integrity constraints.
6 This, in turn, must be an output from some previous transaction in which Alice received this coin.
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6 Denial Constraint Satisfaction
We formally define the denial constraint satisfaction problem, discussed earlier.
I Problem 1 (Denial Constraint Satisfaction). Let D be a blockchain database and q be a
denial constraint. Determine whether D |= ¬q.
We use the measure of data complexity (i.e., we assume the denial constraint is of constant
size, while the size of the database is unbounded), as otherwise, query evaluation over a
standard database is already intractable.
The complexity of the denial constraint satisfaction problem varies greatly, depending on
the language of the denial constraints, as well as the types of integrity constraints allowed.
In the following we use ∆ to denote a subset of {key, fd, ind} (standing for key, functional
dependency, inclusion dependency). A blockchain database is allowed by ∆, if it only contains
integrity constraints of types appearing in ∆.
Given a class of Boolean queries Q, and a set ∆, we use DCSAT(Q,∆) to denote the
denial constraint satisfaction problem for the given class of queries and types of integrity
constraints. Formally, DCSAT(Q,∆) is in complexity class C if, for all q ∈ Q and for all
blockchain databases D allowed by ∆, it is possible to determine whether D |= ¬q in time C.
We note in passing that all hardness results for functional dependencies already hold
when there are only key constraints, and that all hardness results for inclusion dependencies
already hold even when there is a single inclusion dependency.
Classes of Queries.. We consider several classes of queries, defined next. A conjunctive
query has the form q()← P,N,C where P is a conjunction of positive relational atoms, N is
a conjunction of negated relational atoms and C is a conjunction of comparisons of variables
to one another or to constants (using =, <,>, or 6=). We assume that all queries are safe,
i.e., every variable appears in a positive relational atom. A conjunctive query is positive if it
does not contain any negated relational atoms.
Given a set of relations R, the query q returns true if there is an satisfying assignment h
of the variables in the body of q to constants in R such that (1) for all positive relational
atoms a, h(a) ∈ R, (2) for all negated relational atoms a, h(a) 6∈ R and (3) h(C) is satisfied.
Otherwise, q returns false. We use Qc to denote the class of conjunctive queries and Q+c to
denote the subclass containing only positive queries.
An aggregate function α(x¯), where x¯ is an n-ary tuple of variables, is applied to a bag
of n-ary tuples of values, and returns a single value.7 A aggregate query has the form
[q(α(x¯))← P,N,C] θ c where θ ∈ {=, <,>} is a comparison and c is a constant.
Given a set of relations R, let H be the set of all satisfying assignments of the body of
q into R. Let B be the bag {{h(x¯) | h ∈ H}}. Then, the query q returns true if and only if
α(B) θ c is true. For the special case in which B is empty, we consider α(B) θ c to be false.8
The syntax and semantics of the aggregate functions considered in this paper appear in the
appendix. We use Qα to denote the class of all aggregate queries using α, and Q+α to denote
its positive subclass. Finally, we use Qα,θ and Q+α,θ to denote the subclasses of Qα and Q+α ,
respectively, in which the comparison operator is θ.
7 We allow n = 0 to accommodate the aggregate function count, when applied to bags of empty tuples.
8 This choice of semantics seems to be closest to the spirit of SQL. However, one can also choose to
consider α(B) θ c to be true in this case, or to determine the truth value based on θ. Such changes in
semantics will change some of the complexity results.
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I Example 6.1. The denial constraint q1 in Example 5.1 is a positive conjunctive query. We
demonstrate additional denial constraints. Suppose the relation Trusted(pk) contains a list of
private keys of trustworthy individuals. Then q2, ensuring that all bitcoins from Alice are
given to trusted individuals, is a conjunctive query, but is not positive.
q2()←TxInput(pt, ps, ‘AlcPK’, a, ntx, ‘AlcSig’),TxOutput(ntx, s, pk, a′),¬Trusted(pk)
Denial constraint q3 requires that Alice spent at most five bitcoins in total (as otherwise, it
would return the value true)
[q3(sum(a))←TxInput(t, s, ‘AlcPK’, a, nt, ‘AlcSig’)] > 5 ,
while q4 ensures that Alice participated in at most ten transactions in which bitcoins were
given to Bob
[q4(cntd(ntx))←TxInput(pt, ps, ‘AlcPK’, a, ntx, ‘AlcSig’),TxOutput(ntx, s, ‘BobPK’, a′)] > 10 .
Complexity.. Before studying the complexity of DCSAT(Q,∆) for specific cases of Q and
∆, we observe the following result that provides an upper bound on the complexity of the
problems at hand.
I Corollary 6.2. DCSAT(Q,∆) is in CoNP.
This result is a corollary of Proposition 4.3. To see this, suppose q is a denial constraint
and D is a blockchain database (R, I, T ). Given any subset T ′ ⊆ T and an instance
R′ = R ∪ T ′ it is possible to determine in PTIME whether R′ is a possible world of D
(Proposition 4.3). Since we assume that q is of constant size, it is possible to determine in
PTIME whether q evaluates to true over R′. This provides us with the upper bound.
The following theorem states the complexity of denial constraint satisfaction for different
combinations of query classes and types of integrity constraints. We note that this theorem
provides a full characterization for non-aggregate denial constraints, as the cases discussed
clearly imply the complexity of the remaining cases, e.g., DCSAT(Qc, {key, ind}) is CoNP-
complete, since DCSAT(Q+c , {key, ind}) is CoNP-complete, and all problems are in CoNP
by Corollary 6.2.
I Theorem 6.3. The denial constraint satisfaction problem has the following complexity:
1. DCSAT(Qc, {key, fd}) and DCSAT(Qc, {ind}) are in PTIME.
2. DCSAT(Q+c , {key, ind}) is CoNP-complete.
We now consider query classes with aggregation. The complexity of the denial constraint
satisfaction problem depends on the precise aggregate function considered. In the following
theorem we provide a full characterization for the aggregate functions count, cntd (count
distinct), sum and max. We note that the results for max can easily be used to determine the
complexity for min. The complexity results are also summarized in Table 1 in the appendix.
I Theorem 6.4. Let α be an aggregation function. Then,
1. DCSAT(Qmax, {key, fd}) is in PTIME.
2. DCSAT(Qα,<, {key, fd}), with α ∈ {count, cntd, sum}, is in PTIME.
3. DCSAT(Q+α,θ, {key}), with α ∈ {count, cntd, sum}, θ ∈ {>,=}, is CoNP-complete.
4. DCSAT(Q+α,>, {ind}), with α ∈ {count, cntd, sum, max}, is in PTIME.
5. DCSAT(Q+α,θ, {ind}), with α ∈ {count, cntd, sum, max}, θ ∈ {<,=}, is CoNP-complete.
6. DCSAT(Qα,>, {ind}), with α ∈ {count, cntd, sum}, is CoNP-complete.
7. DCSAT(Qmax,>, {ind}) is in PTIME.
8. DCSAT(Q+max{key, ind}) is CoNP-complete.
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7 Generating Transactions
We formally define the problem of generating a transaction that is consistent with some
given transactions, but not with others, as discussed in Section 5. Let D = (R, I, T ) be
a blockchain database. Let Tin and Tout be subsets of T . Let T be a transaction and
D′ = (R, I, T ∪ {T}).
We say that T is mutually consistent with Tin if there exists R′ ∈ Poss(D′), such that
(T
⋃
T ′∈Tin T
′) ⊆ R′. We say that T is inconsistent with Tout if for all R′ ∈ Poss(D′), if
T ⊆ R′, then for all T ′ ∈ Tout, it holds that T ′ 6⊆ R′. Finally, we say that T is (Tin, Tout)-
separating for D if T is both mutually consistent with Tin and inconsistent with Tout .
In general, there may be many (Tin, Tout)-separating transactions T , and such transactions
may be of various sizes. We say that T is minimal if no strict subset of T is (Tin, Tout)-
separating. We say that T is k-bounded if T contains at most k tuples. We define the
following two problems. In both, D = (R, I, T ) is a blockchain database, and Tin, Tout ⊆ T .
I Problem 2 (Minimal Separating Trans.). Generate a minimal (Tin, Tout)-separating trans-
action for D, or determine that one does not exist.
I Problem 3 (Bounded Separating Trans.). For a given number k, generate a k-bounded
(Tin, Tout)-separating transaction for D, or determine that one does not exist.
The complexity of generating separating transactions depends on the types of integrity
constraints in I. Given a set ∆ ⊆ {key, fd, ind}, we use MSEP(∆) and KSEP(∆) to denote
the minimal separating transaction problem, and the bounded separating transaction problem,
respectively, for the given class of integrity constraints. Formally, MSEP(∆) (resp. KSEP(∆))
is in complexity class C if, for all blockchain databases D = (R, I, T ) allowed by ∆, and for
all Tin, Tout ⊆ T , it is possible to generate a minimal (resp. k-bounded) (Tin, Tout)-separating
transaction for D, or determine that one does not exist, in time C.
Key and Functional Dependencies. We start by considering MSEP(∆) and KSEP(∆) when
∆ contains key constraints and functional dependencies. We will show that MSEP(∆) is in
PTIME, while KSEP(∆) is NP-complete.
A polynomial time algorithm for MSEP({key, fd}), called MSEPfd, appears in Figure 3.
In Lines 1–3 of MSEPfd, we check if there exists a possible world containing all of Tin. If
not, by definition, there can be no (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction. Assuming otherwise,
we attempt to build a (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction T and start by initializing T to the
empty set (Line 4).
For each To ∈ Tout, we check if T , together with R, already contradicts To, given the
integrity constraints I. If not (and thus, the condition of Line 6 is true), we attempt to
generate a tuple, to add to T , that will cause R ∪ T ∪ To 6|= I to hold. To this end, the
subprocedureContradict is run. (This subprocedure is explained later on.) IfContradict
returns ⊥, no appropriate tuple can be found, and thus, there is no (Tin, Tout)-separating
transaction (Line 9). Otherwise, the tuple found is added to T , and we proceed to the next
transaction in Tout. Finally, in Lines 11–13, we minimize the set T , so that in Line 14, a
minimal (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction is returned.
In the subprocedure Contradict we iterate over all pairs to ∈ To and X → Y ∈ I, such
that the dependency X → Y is over the relation to which to belongs (Line 1). In Line 2, we
set R to contain all tuples in R (actually this includes all tuples in the original R, in Tin
and in T ) that belong to the same relation as to. Our goal is to find a tuple t such that (1)
{t} ∪R |= I and (2) {to, t} 6|= I.
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Algorithm MSEPfd((R, I, T ), Tin, Tout)
1. R∗ ← R∪Ti∈Tin Ti
2. if R∗ 6|= I then return “failed”
3. T ← ∅
4. for each To ∈ Tout
5. do if R∪ T ∪ To |= I
6. then t← Contradict(To,R∗ ∪ T, I)
7. if t = ⊥
8. then return “failed”
9. else T ← T ∪ {t}
10. for each t ∈ T
11. if T − {t} is (Tin, Tout)-separating then T ← T − {t}
12. return T
Algorithm Contradict(To,R, I)
1. for each to ∈ To and rel(to) : X → Y ∈ I
2. do R← {t′ ∈ R | rel(t′) = rel(to)}
3. t← ChaseFD(to, X, I, R)
4. if {to, t} 6|= I then return t
5. return ⊥
Figure 3 An algorithm that finds a minimal separating transaction, for databases with key
constraints and functional dependencies.
To this end, we apply the procedure ChaseFD in Line 3. This procedure is not provided
in pseudo-code as it is more easily described in text. The procedure ChaseFD starts by
initializing a new tuple t to be equal to to on all attributes in X, while all other attributes
are given new unused values. Then, we perform a chase by repeatedly checking if there is a
dependency U → V in I such that t is equal to some other tuple t′ in R on attributes U .
If this is the case, we update t to be equal to t′ on attributes V . (Note that this update
changes the values in t, not in t′.) This ensures that the result is consistent with I. We can
then show the following result.
I Theorem 7.1. Given a blockchain database with key constraints and functional dependen-
cies, and sets of transactions Tin, Tout, algorithm MSEPfd returns a (Tin, Tout)-separating
transaction, if one exists, and runs in PTIME.
While the above theorem shows that minimal separating transactions can be found in
polynomial time, the next result shows that finding bounded-size separating transactions is
hard. We note that the following result is of interest only when k < |Tout |, as any minimal
separating transaction will be of size at most |Tout | (containing one tuple at most for each
To ∈ Tout), and such minimal separating transactions are easily found.
I Theorem 7.2. KSEP({key}) is NP-complete.
Inclusion Dependencies. We show that a minimal (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction can be
found in polynomial time, if all integrity constraints are inclusion dependencies.
I Theorem 7.3. Given a blockchain database with inclusion dependencies, and sets of
transactions Tin, Tout, it is possible to find a (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction, if one exists,
in PTIME.
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Finding a k-bounded (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction is more difficult. Indeed this
problem is NP-complete, even if all inclusion dependencies are acyclic. For completeness,
we recall the definition of acyclic inclusion dependencies. Let I be a set of inclusion
dependencies over relations R1, . . . , Rn. The dependency graph for I contains a node for each
relation Ri, and an edge from Ri to Rj if there is a inclusion dependency Ri[X1, . . . , Xn] ⊆
Rj [Y1, . . . , Yn] ∈ I. A set of inclusion dependencies is acyclic if its dependency graph is
acyclic.
We can show the following result.
I Theorem 7.4. KSEP({ind}) is NP-complete, even if all inclusion dependencies are acyclic.
Functional and Inclusion Dependencies. We now consider the setting in which I may
include key constraints, functional dependencies and inclusion dependencies. We show that
determining whether there exists a (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction is undecidable in this
case. Undecidability follows from the fact that the implication problem for functional and
inclusion dependencies is undecidable.
I Theorem 7.5. The problem of determining whether there exists a (Tin, Tout)-separating
transaction, when I can include functional dependencies and inclusion dependencies, is
undecidable.
8 Future Research and Open Problems
Our work has only taken initial steps in answering questions related to databases based on
blockchains. In this section we list open questions and possible extensions of the research we
have presented.
Economic Considerations for Possible Worlds. When issuing a transaction, the user defines
a fee that will be accrued by the miner that incorporates the transaction into a block.
Miners choose transactions in a way that will maximize the fees accumulated. Due to the
dependencies between transactions, the strategies choosing which transactions to include
are complex. In our model, all possible worlds are equally valid. However, when taking the
economic realities into consideration, this implies some type of weighting or probabilities to
the possible worlds. Interesting questions, such as the contradiction of denial constraints in
likely worlds, or generating likely transactions, then arise.
Generating Transactions with Constraints. In this paper, we studied the problem of
generating (Tin, Tout)-separating transactions. Indeed, automatic transaction generation is an
important tool to aid the user in formulating transactions that avoid undesirable outcomes.
In the setting considered thus far, we did not consider additional user-defined constraints on
the transaction being generated, and hence, e.g., could choose any new constants to be used
in the transactions generated. An important generalization of this work is to allow the user
to specify constraints (perhaps in the form of a query or as domain information) that the
transaction generated must satisfy. Devising efficient algorithms for transaction generation
in this setting is both useful and challenging.
Database management under advanced protocols such as the Lightning network. Block-
chain databases typically suffer from low throughput and high transaction acceptance time.
Off-chain transaction channels, along with their composition into the Lightning Network [30],
make up one of the proposals put forth to alleviate these issues. Off-chain transaction
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channels form a protocol layer that assumes the existence of blockchains. The basic elements
of off-chain transaction channels are regular transactions that are exchanged between the
participants in the protocol. These transactions aggregate several payments over time, and
are admitted into the blockchain only at the closure of the channel, to finalize the aggregate
result of the interactions. The transactions that are exchanged are created in a way as to
avoid undesirable states, such as one participant stealing money using intermediate states.
Just like our work considers possible worlds that the blockchain database may end up
in, security of the Lighting Network protocol depends strongly on the same type of analysis.
This can be seen as a version of our problem, but on steroids. Given its importance for
scalability, this is a highly important problem.
Detecting independent or commutative transaction sets. Some protocols can offer im-
provements to transaction processing via the consensus mechanism if it can be guaranteed
that transactions are independent of one another in some manner. The SPECTRE pro-
tocol [37] for example, can provide faster processing times for transactions as long as they
can be committed to the database in any order (i.e., they are commutative). While this is
not generally the case for arbitrary data, this does hold true for simple payments that come
from different sources. The question of identifying such commutative transactions (or sets
of transactions) and utilizing similar fast consensus mechanisms in databases, other than
cryptocurrencies, is an important open problem.
More advanced strategies for Bitcoin unspent output management. Bitcoin wallets
effectively set aside several transaction outputs of different sizes that are to be used when
composing new transactions. Once a transaction is prepared, the output used by that
transaction cannot be reused. To maintain flexibility, wallet software prepares outputs of
different sizes that can be composed together to provide payments. The management of such
output, while taking into consideration fees that are associated with producing the related
transactions, can be greatly improved and will gain much from formal treatment. This
problem is akin to maintaining a level of flexibility that will allow one to cheaply respond to
requests from the user on unknown inputs that may come in the future. This is a special
new type of transaction generation problem.
9 Conclusion
This paper studied theoretical foundations for blockchain databases. To this end, we formally
defined a blockchain database, and introduced two important problems. First, we considered
the complexity of denial constraint satisfaction. The ability to determine if a denial constraint
will always hold is critical in deciding if a new transaction can be safely issued. Second, we
studied the problem of automatically generating transactions that can be used to separate
between sets of pending transactions. This again, is pivotal in order to ensure that a new
transaction cannot be included together with some already issued transactions.
Blockchain databases are a cutting-edge technology, and there are much efforts in the
industry to bring blockchain databases to the developer and end user. These efforts are
insufficient without thorough study of the ramifications of this new model on critical database
operations. This paper has begun such a study and charted open problems of interest that
should be considered by the database community. As such, we hope this paper will serve as
a springboard for active research in the important and timely area of blockchain databases.
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A Integrity Constraints
In this paper we consider key constraints, functional dependencies and inclusion dependencies.
These notions are defined next. Let R be a relation over attributes A1, . . . , An. Let X and
Y be subsets of {A1, . . . , An}. A functional dependency has the form
X → Y .
We say that this dependency is satisfied by R, if, for every two tuples t and s in R it holds
that( ∧
A∈X
t[A] = s[A]
)
⇒
( ∧
B∈Y
t[B] = s[B
)
.
A key constraint is simply a functional dependency in which Y = {A1, . . . , An}.
Finally, let R′ be a relation over attributes B1, . . . , Bm. An inclusion dependency has the
form
R[Ai1 , . . . Aik ] ⊆ R′[Bj1 , . . . , Bjk ]
and is satisfied by R and R′ if, for every tuple t ∈ R, there exists a tuple t′ ∈ R′ such that∧
l≤k
]t[Ail ] = t′[Bjl ] .
B Aggregate Functions
In this paper, we consider four aggregate functions, namely, count, cntd (count distinct), sum
and max. The functions count and cntd are well-defined when applied to a bag containing
tuples of any fixed arity, while sum and max are well defined only when applied to bags
containing tuples of arity one. Moreover, sum is applicable only over numerical domains, and
max is applicable over domains that are completely ordered.
Given a bag B, let vals(B) be the set of values appearing in B, and let mult(v,B) be the
multiplicity of v in B. The semantics of these functions are formally defined as follows for a
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bag B:
count(B) =
∑
v∈vals(B)
mult(v,B) sum(B) =
∑
v∈vals(B)
mult(v,B)× v
cntd(B) = |vals(B)| max(B) = max{v | v ∈ vals(B)} .
C Proofs
I Proposition 4.3. Let D be a blockchain database and let R′ be a set of relations. It is
possible to determine if R′ ∈ Poss(D) in PTIME.
Proof. Let D = (R, I, T ) and let R′ be a set of relations. Let T ′ ⊆ T be the set of all
transactions T ∈ T such that T is contained in R′.
To check if R′ ∈ Poss(D), first determine if R′ contains any contradictions to the key
and functional dependencies in I. If so, clearly R′ 6∈ Poss(D). Next, check if R∪ T ′ = R′.
If not, again, R′ cannot be a possible world. Finally, iteratively choose a transaction T ∈ T ′
that can be added to R without contradicting any inclusion dependencies, and remove T
from T ′. Continue this process until either we have derived R′, in which case R′ ∈ Poss(D),
or until no further progress can be made, in which case R′ 6∈ Poss(D). J
I Theorem 6.3. The denial constraint satisfaction problem has the following complexity:
1. DCSAT(Qc, {key, fd}) and DCSAT(Qc, {ind}) are in PTIME.
2. DCSAT(Q+c , {key, ind}) is CoNP-complete.
Proof. We first show that DCSAT(Qc, {key, fd}) is in PTIME. Let q be a denial constraint
with k positive relational atoms in its body and let D = (R, I, T ) be a blockchain database.
Clearly, there is a possible world R′ for which q returns true only if there is one derived
by a subset of transactions T ′ of size at most k. To see this, observe that at most one
transaction is needed to satisfy each positive relational atom. Note that if there were inclusion
dependencies, this might not be sufficient, as one transaction might imply the inclusion of
another.
Now, for every subset of T ′ ⊆ T of size k or less, we
check if R∪ T ′ is a possible world and
evaluate q on R∪ T ′, to determine if q returns true.
If all R∪ T ′ return false, we can conclude that D |= ¬q. This procedure is in PTIME, as k
is a constant.
Next, we show that DCSAT(Qc, {ind}) is in PTIME. Let P , N and C be the positive,
negated atoms and comparisons in the body of q. We will consider every possible mapping
of the variables in q to constants in R or T , and check if there is a possible world, for which
this mapping produces the Boolean value true. To be precise, for each mapping h of the
variables in q to constants in R or T , such that h(P ) ⊆ R∪T∈T T , h(N) ∩R = ∅ and h(C)
is satisfied, we
remove all transactions from T containing any atom from h(N);
iteratively choose a transaction T ∈ T that can be added to R without contradicting
any inclusion dependencies, and remove T from T . We continue this process until either
T = ∅, or until no further progress can be made. Let Rh be the result. (Note that the
result of this process is well defined, as we only consider inclusion dependencies.)
check if the Rh contains h(P ). If so, this is a counter-example to the denial constraint.
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Aggregate function Comparison Integrity Constraints Complexity
max >,<,= key, fd PTIME
> ind PTIME
<,= ind CoNP-C
>,<,= key, ind CoNP-C
count, cntd, sum < key, fd PTIME
>,= key CoNP-C
> ind PTIME (positive queries)
CoNP-C (queries with negation)
<,= ind CoNP-C
Table 1 Summary of complexity results for the denial constraint satisfaction problem for positive
query classes with aggregation. Since key constraints are a special case of functional dependencies,
all hardness results for keys still hold in the presence of functional dependencies.
Since q is of constant size, this process is polynomial, and clearly finds a counter-example if
one exists.
Finally, we show that DCSAT(Q+c , {key, ind}) is CoNP-complete. Membership in CoNP
follows from Corollary 6.2. We show hardness by a reduction from the complement of 3-SAT.
Let φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn be a 3-SAT formula, where φi is a disjunction of variables or their negation
from x1, . . . , xm. We define a database with the relations Clause1(C), Val(X,B), Clause2(C)
and Sat(S). Initially, all relations are empty. The attribute X is a key in Val, and there is
an inclusion constraint Clause2[C]⊆ Clause1[C].
The set of transactions includes, for each literal l in a disjunct φi, the set {Clause1(i),
Val(x, t)} if l is the positive literal x, or the set {Clause1(i), Val(x, f)} if l is the negative
literal x¯. In addition, there is a transaction {Sat(t), Clause2(1), . . ., Clause2(n)}. Finally,
the denial constraint is q()←Sat(t). It is not difficult to see that there is a possible world
in which the denial constraint evaluates to true if and only if the formula is satisfiable.
Intuitively, the key constraint in Val ensures that the tuples in this relation correspond to a
truth assignment. The inclusion dependency ensures that Clause2 will be populated only if
Clause1 is populated, which, in turn, implies that the formula is satisfied. J
I Theorem 6.4. Let α be an aggregation function. Then,
1. DCSAT(Qmax, {key, fd}) is in PTIME.
2. DCSAT(Qα,<, {key, fd}), with α ∈ {count, cntd, sum}, is in PTIME.
3. DCSAT(Q+α,θ, {key}), with α ∈ {count, cntd, sum}, θ ∈ {>,=}, is CoNP-complete.
4. DCSAT(Q+α,>, {ind}), with α ∈ {count, cntd, sum, max}, is in PTIME.
5. DCSAT(Q+α,θ, {ind}), with α ∈ {count, cntd, sum, max}, θ ∈ {<,=}, is CoNP-complete.
6. DCSAT(Qα,>, {ind}), with α ∈ {count, cntd, sum}, is CoNP-complete.
7. DCSAT(Qmax,>, {ind}) is in PTIME.
8. DCSAT(Q+max{key, ind}) is CoNP-complete.
Proof. We start by showing Claim 1 and 2. These results can be proven in the same manner
as the proof that DCSAT(Qc, {key, fd}) is in PTIME, in Theorem 6.3. Intuitively, the same
proof (which considers all databases including at most k transactions), is sufficient in this
case, too, since if there is a database over which q returns true, there is also such a “small”
database.
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We now consider Claim 3. We start by assuming that α = count, θ is “>” and show
hardness by a reduction from the complement of 3-SAT. Let φ1∧· · ·∧φn be a 3-SAT formula,
where φi is a disjunction of variables or their negation from x1, . . . , xm. We define a database
with the relations Clause(C) and Val(X,B). Initially, all relations are empty. The attribute
X is a key in Val.
The set of transactions includes, for each literal l in a disjunct φi, the set {Clause(i),
Val(x, t)} if l is the positive literal x, or the set {Clause(i), Val(x, f)} if l is the negative
literal x¯. Finally, the denial constraint is [q(count)←Clause(i)] > n− 1. It is not difficult to
see that there is a possible world in which the denial constraint evaluates to true if and only
if the formula is satisfiable. Intuitively, the key constraint in Val ensures that the tuples in
this relation correspond to a truth assignment. The denial constraint requires there to be at
least n satisfied clauses. Hence, the denial constraint is satisfied only if there is no possible
world in which all clauses are satisfied, i.e., if the formula is unsatisfiable.
For cntd and sum, can use the same construction, but with the denial constraints:
[q(cntd(i))← Clause(i)] > n− 1 [q(sum(i))← Clause(i)] > n(n+ 1)2 − 1
Finally, when θ is “=” we use the same denial constraints, but add one to the number on the
righthand-side and replace the comparison operator with “=”.
We show Claim 4. Let Rmax be the database derived by iteratively adding transactions
from T to R while satisfying all inclusion dependencies. (Note that Rmax is unique as we
only consider inclusion dependencies.) It is easy to see that for all R′ ∈ Poss(D) it holds
that R ⊆ R′ ⊆ Rmax. Hence, when the comparison operator is “>” it is sufficient to check
whether q returns true over Rmax.
We show Claim 5 by a reduction from the complement of 3-SAT. Let φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn be a
3-SAT formula, where φi is a disjunction of variables or their negation from x1, . . . , xm. We
define a database with the relations Clause1(C), Val(X,B), Clause2(C), Sat(S). Initially, all
Clause1, Clause2 and Sat are empty. The relation Val has two rows (0, t) and (0, f). There
is an inclusion constraint Clause2[C]⊆ Clause1[C].
The set of transactions includes, for each literal l in a disjunct φi, the set {Clause1(i),
Val(x, t)} if l is the positive literal x, or the set {Clause1(i), Val(x, f)} if l is the negative
literal x¯. In addition, there is a transaction {Sat(t), Clause2(1), . . ., Clause2(n)}. Finally,
we consider the following denial constraints (according to the value of α):
[q(count)← Sat(t),Val(x, b),Val(x, b′), b 6= b′] < 3
[q(cntd(x))← Sat(t),Val(x, b),Val(x, b′), b 6= b′] < 2
[q(sum(x))← Sat(t),Val(x, b),Val(x, b′), b 6= b′] < 1
[q(max(x))← Sat(t),Val(x, b),Val(x, b′), b 6= b′] < 1
(If θ is “=” we replace “<” with “=” and decrease the number of the righthand-side by one. )
It is not difficult to see that there is a possible world in which the denial constraint evaluates
to true if and only if the formula is satisfiable. To see why, recall that an aggregate denial
constraint can evaluate to true only if there is a satisfying assignment for its body. Thus,
e.g., the first denial constraint above will return true only if there is a possible world in which
Sat(t) is included, and this world contains only one value for x associated with two different
b-s, i.e., precisely only (0, t), (0, f). This will yield exactly two satisfying assignments for the
body of the constraint.
We show Claim 6. We use a similar setting to Claim 5, but add an additional relation
Truth(T ) containing two rows (t), (f), as well as a transaction {Val(x, t)} and {Val(x, f)},
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for every variable x. Let B(t, x, b, b′) be the conjunction
Sat(t),Val(x, b),¬Val(x, b′),Truth(b′).
We use the following denial constraints (according to the value of α):
[q(count)← B(t, x, b, b′)] > n− 1
[q(cntd(x))← B(t, x, b, b′)] > n− 1
[q(sum(x))← B(t, x, b, b′)] > n(n+ 1)2 − 1
which return true when a possible world includes Sat(t), and all variables have a single truth
assignment.
Claim 7 can be shown using essentially the same proof as that of DCSAT(Qc, {ind}) in
Claim 1 of Theorem 6.3. Finally, Claim 8 can be shown using essentially the same proof as
that of Claim 2 in Theorem 6.3, using the denial constraint
[q(max(x))← Sat(x)] θ tθ
where t= is t, t< is t+ 1 and t> is t− 1. Note that is is correct, as by definition, a denial
constraint can only return true if there is a satisfying assignment for its body. J
I Theorem 7.1. Given a blockchain database with key constraints and functional dependen-
cies, and sets of transactions Tin, Tout, algorithm MSEPfd returns a (Tin, Tout)-separating
transaction, if one exists, and runs in PTIME.
Proof. The polynomial runtime is immediate from examination of the algorithm. Hence,
we focus on correctness. We first consider the case in which the algorithm returns a set T
(i.e., does not return “failed”). The set T is consistent with R, as well as all of Tin , as this is
assured by applying the chase procedure in Line 3 of Contradict. It also holds that for
all To ∈ Tout, there is no possible world including both T and To, as the inclusion of the
tuple returned from Contradict, when called with To, contradicts To given the integrity
constraints (Line 4 of Contradict). Hence T is (Tin, Tout)-separating.
To see that T is also minimal, observe that the following property is easy to show
for (Tin, Tout)-separating transactions, when all integrity constraints are key constraints or
functional dependencies: Let {t} ⊆ T1 ⊆ T2 be transactions such that both T1 and T2 are
(Tin, Tout)-separating. Then, if T1 − {t} is (Tin, Tout)-separating, it also holds that T2 − {t}
is (Tin, Tout)-separating. This property implies that if we choose not to remove a tuple t
in the loop of Line 11 of MSEPfd, it will not be possible to remove t later on. Thus, the
transaction returned by this function is indeed minimal.
We now consider the cases in which MSEPfd returns “failed”. If MSEPfd returns
“failed” on Line 3, there is no (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction, as R∗ 6|= I, and hence, there
is no possible world containing R, Tin, T , for any T . We show that if MSEPfd returns
“failed” on Line 9, then there is no (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction.
If MSEPfd returns “failed” upon the first iteration of the loop of Line 5, then clearly
there is no (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction, as it is not possible to find a tuple that together
with To contradicts the integrity constraints, while being consistent with R and Tin. On
subsequent iterations of the loop of Line 5, a return of “failed” implies that it is not possible
to find a tuple t that together with To contradicts the integrity constraints, while being
consistent with R, Tin and the set T created thus far. We now show that if this is the
case, then it is not possible to find a tuple t that together with To contradicts the integrity
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constraints, while being consistent with R and Tin (i.e., our choice of T is irrelevant to the
ability to contradiction To).
By way of contradiction, suppose that we return “failed” for transaction To, but there
exists a tuple t such that R∗ ∪ {t} |= I and To ∪ {t} 6|= I. Then, there is a tuple to ∈ To
and an integrity constraint X → A over the relation of to, such that t[X] = to[X], but
t[A] 6= to[A]. (To simplify the proof, we assume, without loss of generality, that all functional
dependencies have a single attribute on their righthand-side.) Clearly such a tuple can be
derived by equating t with to on X, choosing new constants for all other attributes of t, and
chasing the tuple t with R∗. Let t1 be the result of chasing t with R∗.
Since we assume that we returned “failed” for To, it follows that the chaise of t with
R∗ ∪ T equated t[A] to the same value as to[A], even though, by assumption, the chase of t
with R∗ did not do so. Let t2 be the result of chasing t with R∗ ∪ T . It follows that there is
some tuple t′ ∈ T and some Y → A in I such that t2[Y ] = t′[Y ] and t′[A] = to[A].
Since t2[Y ] = t′[Y ], it follows that Y is not a new constant. Therefore, there is some
other tuple t′′ ∈ R∗ for which t′′[Y ] = t′[Y ] = t2[Y ]. Due to the functional dependency
Y → A, it follows that t′′[A] = t′[A] = to[A]. It then follows that the chase of t with R∗
must have equated t[A] to to[A] (using t′′), in contradiction to the assumption. Hence, it
follows that if we return “failed” for transaction To, there indeed does not exist a tuple t
such that R∗ ∪ {t} |= I and To ∪ {t} 6|= I. J
I Theorem 7.2. KSEP({key}) is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership in NP can easily be shown, as a polynomial-sized witness can be guessed
and verified. To see that a witness is polynomial-sized, note that it if there is a witness,
then there is one containing at most min({|Tout |, k}) tuples. Note also that it is sufficient
to guess constants from among a domain containing all constants in R, Tin, Tout , as well as
|Tout | arbitrary new constants for each attribute of each relation.
NP-hardness is shown by a reduction to hitting set. Let U be a universe of values and
let S be a set of sets of values from U . Given a value k, the hitting set problem is to find a
subset U ′ ⊆ U of size at most k, such that for each S ∈ S, it holds that U ′ ∩ S 6= ∅.
Given an instance U,S, k of the hitting set problem, we create an instance of KSEP({key}, k)
as follows. We assume there is a single relation R(A,B). For each S ∈ S, we create a
transaction TS containing the tuples {(x, 0) | x ∈ S}. Let D be the blockchain database
(∅, {R : A→ B}, T ) where T = {TS | S ∈ S}). Choose Tin = ∅ and Tout = T .
Clearly, there is a one-to-one correspondence between hitting sets of size k and (Tin, Tout)-
separating transactions of size k. Specifically, x1, . . . , xk is a hitting set if and only if
{(x1, 1), . . . , (xk, 1)} is a (Tin, Tout)-separating transactions of size k. J
I Theorem 7.3. Given a blockchain database with inclusion dependencies, and sets of
transactions Tin, Tout, it is possible to find a (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction, if one exists,
in PTIME.
Proof. In order to find a (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction, we start by initializing T to be
the empty set. Let c be a new unused constant. Then, we iterate over the tuples ti in the
transactions of Tin . While there is some inclusion dependency R[X1, . . . , Xn] ⊆ S[Y1, . . . , Yn]
over the relation R of ti, such that there is no tuple t′ in S with ti[X1, . . . , Xn] = t′[Y1, . . . , Yn],
we create such a tuple by generating a tuple t over S with
t[Y1, . . . , Yn] = ti[X1, . . . , Xn] and
the constant c for all other attributes.
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We then add t to T . We continue chasing the newly generated tuple t with respect to the
integrity constraints, and adding new tuples as required. In all undetermined attributes, we
set the value to the same constant c.
Observe that the above process is finitely terminating (and polynomial, in fact), since all
“new” values are set to c. Observe too, that at the end of this process, it is guaranteed that
R∪Ti∈Tin Ti ∪ T |= I .
However, it is possible that T is not (Tin, Tout)-separating as it may not meet the requirements
for Tout .
In order to determine if T is (Tin, Tout)-separating we find the single maximal possible
world, by starting with R and then adding transactions from T ∪ T that are consistent with
the integrity constraints. If this process allows us to add a transaction from Tout , we conclude
that T is not a (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction. Indeed, we can actually conclude that
there is no (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction, as the above procedure is simply a minimal
chasing of Tin with I, and our choice of values for undefined constants was always the same
value c, which does not, in itself, aid in satisfying the integrity constraints for tuples in Tout .
It now remains to minimize T . This is accomplished as in Lines 11-13 of MSEPfd, by
iteratively attempting to remove a tuple t, and checking if the result is still a (Tin, Tout)-
separating transaction. Note that the latter is accomplished by iteratively attempting to
expand R by transactions in T and other tuples in T , until all of Tin can be included—in
which case t is not needed, or until termination—in which case t is necessary. The result is
guaranteed to be minimal for the same reasons as in Theorem 7.1. J
I Theorem 7.4. KSEP({ind}) is NP-complete, even if all inclusion dependencies are acyclic.
Proof. We show the required by a reduction from 3-SAT. Let φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn be a 3-SAT
formula, where φi is a disjunction of variables or their negation from x1, . . . , xk. We create a
blockchain database, in which the set of relations is: Assign1(X,V ), Assign2(X,V ), Truth(V ),
Sat(X1, . . . , Xk), Clause1(C), Clause2(C). The relation Truth contains two rows (t), (f),
while all other relations are empty. In addition, we have the inclusion dependencies
Assign1[V ] ⊆ Truth[V ]
Assign2[X,V ] ⊆ Assign1[X,V ]
(∀i ≤ k) Sat[Xi] ⊆ Assign1[X]
Clause2[C] ⊆ Clause1[C]
The set T includes the following transactions:
for each i ≤ k, there is a transaction containing the tuples Assign2(xi, t), as well as
Clause1(cj), for all j such that xi appears positively in clause j;
for each i ≤ k, there is a transaction containing the tuples Assign2(xi, f), as well as
Clause1(cj), for all j such that xi appears negatively in clause j;
a transaction containing Clause2(c1), . . . ,Clause2(cn), Sat(x1, . . . , xk).
The last of the transactions described above is the only transaction in Tin. The set Tout is
empty.
We now show that there is a (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction of size k if and only if
there is a satisfying assignment for the 3-SAT formula. For the first direction, suppose there
is a satisfying assignment for the 3-SAT formula. We define the transaction T to contains
Assign1(x, t) for each variable x assigned to true, and Assign1(x, f) for all variables assigned
to false. Now, observe that there is a possible world containing Tin, i.e., precisely the world
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containing T , along with the transactions containing Assign2(x, t) and Assign2(x, f), for all
variables assigned true and false, respectively.
Conversely, suppose that there is a (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction T of size k. In order
for there to be a possible world including Tin , the transaction T must contain an atom of the
form Assign1(x, t) or Assign1(x, f), for each variable x (so that the inclusion dependency on
Sat will be satisfied). Since T is of size at most k, there must be precisely one item of this
type for each variable x. Now, in order for Tin to be part of a possible world, we must be
able to satisfy the inclusion dependency of Clause2. This will occur if and only if the atoms
in T form a truth assignment in the 3-SAT formula. J
I Theorem 7.5. The problem of determining whether there exists a (Tin, Tout)-separating
transaction, when I can include functional dependencies and inclusion dependencies, is
undecidable.
Proof. We show the required by a reduction from the implication problem. In [10], it was
shown that, given a set of functional dependencies F and a set of inclusion dependencies
I, as well as a functional (or inclusion) dependency f , the problem of determining whether
F ∪ T |= f is undecidable. Given an instance of this problem, i.e., F , I, and a functional
dependency f = R : X1, . . . , Xn → A, we create an instance of the (Tin, Tout)-separating
transaction problem as follows.
R contains empty instances of all relations mentioned in F or I, as well as a relation S
with schema (X1, . . . , Xn, A);
I contains F , I and the inclusion dependency
S[X1, . . . , Xn, A] ⊆ R[X1, . . . , Xn, A] ;
T = Tin contains the single transaction
{S(x1, . . . , xn, a1), S(x1, . . . , xn, a2)} .
Now, there is a (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction if and only if there is some instance of the
relations in which R contradicts the functional dependency f , as it must include the values of
the tuples in S. Thus, there is a (Tin, Tout)-separating transaction if and only if F ∪ T 6|= f ,
thereby showing undecidability, as required. J
